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I.

INTRODUCTION

Was the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) really about
fairness? If so, fairness to whom?'
However one answers these questions, one of CAFA's
principal means to accomplishing its ends was forum shopping.
Forum shopping is a charge most commonly leveled against
plaintiffs. As the "masters of their complaint," 2 plaintiffs decide

* Professor of Law & Michael J. Zimmer Fellow, Seton Hall University
School of Law. Thanks to the Association of American Law Schools' Section on
Litigation for the opportunity to participate in this symposium and on the panel at
the AALS 2013 annual meeting, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:
Perspectives and Predictions, and to the Sections on Civil Procedure and Federal
Courts for co-sponsoring this panel. I am also grateful to my fellow panelists John
Beisner, Elizabeth Cabreser, Rick Marcus, Linda Mullenix, Jay Tidmarsh, and
Georgene Vairo for a lively and enlightening discussion. Finally, thanks to the
editors of The Review ofLitigation for their willingness to publish this symposium,
and for their excellent editorial work on this article.
1. This question, in fact, was the title of a University of Pennsylvania Law
See
Review symposium that occurred shortly after CAFA was enacted.
Act
of
Fairness
Class
Action
on
the
Perspectives
to
Whom?
Fairness
Symposium,
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).
2.
See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 94 (2005) (noting that
the plaintiffs are "masters of their complaint"); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (same).
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where to file their case, and they may craft their claims with an eye
toward keeping the case in their most desired forum. Forum
shopping can be a two-way street, however. Procedural devices
often enable defendants to change the plaintiffs' initial choice of
forum-removal from state court to federal court, 3 transfer of
venue,4 dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,5 or forum non conveniens
dismissal.6 Such countermoves by a defendant are also forms of
forum shopping. 7
According to its legislative history, CAFA was particularly
concerned with the following scenario: plaintiffs choose to file a
class action in state court-particularly a state court that is perceived
to be more willing to certify class actions than its federal
counterpart. Defendants, who prefer the federal approach to class
certification, seek to remove the class action to federal court. Which
side will succeed in getting their desired forum ultimately depends
on the intricacies of federal jurisdiction. One of CAFA's primary
objectives was to expand the universe of cases where defendants
would win these forum-shopping battles; it did so by creating a new
form of diversity jurisdiction and eliminating other obstacles to

3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
4. Id. § 1404(a).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)-(2).
6. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (affirming the
district court's forum non conveniens dismissal).
7. See, e.g., Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504,
508-09 (2001) (stating that to allow federal and state courts to give different
preclusive effects to statute of limitations dismissals "would produce the sort of
forum-shopping . .. and ... inequitable administration of the laws that Erie seeks
to avoid" because "[o]ut-of-state defendants . .. would systematically remove
state-law suits brought against them to federal court") (internal quotation marks
omitted). My use of the term "forum shopping" is not meant to have any
derogative connotation. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C.
L. REv. 333, 336 (2006) ("Key to the understanding of the appropriate role of
forum shopping, however, is a foundational premise: playing by the rules includes
the ability of plaintiffs counsel to select which set of rules and the ability of
defense counsel to try to counter that choice. Accordingly, disparaging remarks
about forum shopping-implying that the practice is a form of cheating because a
litigant is attempting to circumvent the rules-misapprehend the 'rules."').
8. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5
(stating that pre-CAFA law "enables lawyers to 'game' the procedural rules and
keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts whose judges have
reputations for readily certifying classes . . . .").

Symposium 2013]

CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS A CT

651

removing state court class actions to federal court. 9 Once in federal
court, class certification could be decided by federal judges pursuant
to federal law, rather than by state judges pursuant to state law.
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowlesto-a CAFA case
recently decided by the Supreme Court-illustrates all too vividly
the lengths to which plaintiffs and defendants will go when it comes
to this sort of forum shopping. The plaintiffs state-court complaint
in StandardFirevoluntarily refused to seek the maximum amount of
damages that the class might receive under the governing law,
stipulating that the class would not seek damages in excess of $5
million. 1 ' That figure, of course, is the threshold that would have
enabled the defendant to remove under CAFA.12 The StandardFire
defendant, who wished to be in federal court, arued that absent
class members should not be bound by the waiver -which in turn

9. See id. at 5 ("Thus, [CAFA] makes it harder for plaintiffs' counsel to
'game the system' by trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction.").
10. 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
11. Id. at 1347 ("[T]he complaint says that the Plaintiff and Class stipulate
they will seek to recover total aggregate damages of less than five million dollars.
An attached affidavit stipulates that Knowles will not at any time during this case
seek damages for the class in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.") (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (requiring that "the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5,000,000"); id. § 1332(d)(6) ("In any class action, the claims
of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .").
13. Petition for Writ of Cert., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 111450, 2012 WL 1979957, at *13-14 (May 30, 2012) ("Allowing a named plaintiff
to bind absent putative class members to a limitation on damages, and giving effect
to such a 'stipulation' as of the time of removal, plainly violates basic due process
rights of the absent putative class members."). An amicus curiae brief filed in
Standard Fire argued that removal was proper, regardless of whether the amount
in controversy exceeded $5 million, because the plain text of CAFA's removal
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, is "a broad authorization of federal removal
jurisdiction over class-action suits in which the parties are minimally diverse" that
does not incorporate "the criteria for original jurisdiction under § 1332(d)." Brief
for the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae Suggesting
Reversal, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, 2012 WL 5351709, at
*10 (Oct. 29, 2012). For a discussion of the statutory language supporting this
argument, which appears to be the result of a drafting mistake, see Adam N.
Steinman, Sausage-Making,Pigs' Ears,and CongressionalExpansions of Federal
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would bring the amount-in-controversy above CAFA's threshold for
federal jurisdiction.14 And the defendant succeeded. The Supreme
Court unanimously held that the named plaintiffs stipulation could
not bind the absent class members and therefore could not prevent
CAFA removal.' 5
Did the defendant in StandardFire truly wish to pay the class
more than it was asking for? Of course not. The defendant's
calculus was that, in federal court, there would be a lower likelihood
that a class action would be certified at all, which would take the
potential for a large aggregated judgment entirely off the table.' 6
Implicit in CAFA's logic-and the strategic machinations it
inspires-is a crucial presumption that apparently went unquestioned
during the debate leading to CAFA's enactment: namely, that federal
courts exercising CAFA's new form of diversity jurisdiction may
indeed apply federal class-certification standards in CAFA cases
rather than state certification standards. This premise has a
potentially significant vulnerability, however. Just as Superman's
powers faded in the presence of kryptonite,17 CAFA's logic may
unravel when confronted with the Erie doctrine.

Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and Its Lessons for the Class Action
FairnessAct, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279 (2006). The StandardFire defendant never
asserted this as a basis for removal-either in the courts below or before the
Supreme Court-and the Supreme Court's opinion does not address it.
14 See StandardFire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348 ("[T]he District Court found that
that the sum or value of the amount in controversy would, in the absence of the
stipulation, have fallen just above the $5 million threshold." (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
15 See id. at 1350 ("In sum, the stipulation at issue here can tie Knowles'
hands, but it does not resolve the amount-in-controversy question in light of his
inability to bind the rest of the class.").
16. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic
Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942-43 (2006)
("The goal of CAFA's proponents was to ensure that nationwide classes of the sort
that some state courts had certified would not be certified at all.").
17. See Superman, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078346/
synopsis (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (detailing a plot synopsis for the movie
Superman (1978)); see also Superman ChristopherReeve Defeated by Kryptonite,
YouTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkSaAhbceBk (last visited
Oct. 27, 2013) (depicting Superman being defeated by kryptonite); accord Spin
Doctors - Jimmy Olsen 's Blues, YOUTUBE.COM,
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-GrQCro68sRU (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (explaining how Jimmy Olsen
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"discourage[] ... forum-shopping"-

specifically, vertical forum shopping between state courts and
federal courts.' 8 Erie does this by requiring the federal court to act
like "the State court a block away."l 9 Erie thereby eliminates what
otherwise might be an incentive for one side to choose federal
court-the desire to avoid a comparatively unfavorable aspect of
state law-because that state law will apply in federal court as well.
Applied to CAFA, Erie's aims invite an ironic result. CAFA would
enable state court class actions to be removed to federal court
pursuant to its expansion of diversity jurisdiction. 20 But then Erie
would require the federal court to follow the same state-court
approach to class certification that CAFA was meant to evade.21
The possibility that Erie might require federal courts to
follow state class-certification standards garnered fairly little
attention until the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Company,22 a case that
found its way into federal court thanks to CAFA.2 3 At first blush,
might have wooed Lois Lane away from Superman if he had a "pocket full of
kryptonite").
18. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965).
19. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
20. See S. REP. No. 109-14, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the primary
objectives of CAFA).
21. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (stating that Erie aims to discourage
forum shopping).
22. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company,
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
23. Id. at 1437 n.3 ("Shady Grove had asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2). . . ."). Some of my earlier writings-both before and after Shady
Grove-examine whether the Erie doctrine might require federal courts to follow
state law on class actions. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?
(And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of JudicialFederalism?),
84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245 (2008) [hereinafter Steinman, What Is the Erie
Doctrine?]; Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism:Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131 (2011)
[hereinafter Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism]. The topic is worth
revisiting not only because of the opportunity this symposium provides to reflect
on CAFA (and its coincidental timing during Erie's seventy-fifth anniversary), but
also because post-Shady Grove lower court decisions are beginning to accumulate.
See infra Part IV.C. The Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), is another significant development, as it may
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Shady Grove appears to undermine the idea. By a 5-4 vote, the
Court rejected the argument that federal courts were bound to follow
New York law on the permissibility of the class action brought in

that case.24
On closer analysis, however, parts of the Shady Grove
decision actually strengthen the Erie argument. In particular, all nine
Justices agreed that differences between state courts and federal
courts with respect to class certification encourage precisely the kind
of vertical forum shopping that Erie seeks to discourage. 25
Ultimately, that unanimous conclusion was not dispositive because
of the interplay between Erie and the Rules Enabling Act (REA),
which imposes a more complex doctrinal framework for issues
where a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (like Rule 23) is in the
picture. But as I will explain in more detail below, the application of
that framework by the narrow Shady Grove majority is hardly the
last word on the role of state class action practice in federal court.

II.

CAFA AND

OUR CLASS ACTION FEDERALISM

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of CAFA was its
expansion of federal jurisdiction over high-stakes class actions.
CAFA's new form of diversity jurisdiction,26 combined with its
elimination of rocedural obstacles for defendants wishing to remove
class actions, made it much easier for defendants to demand a
federal forum if that was their preference. And it often was.
According to the conventional wisdom, federal judges applying

increase the disparity between the federal approach to class certification and the
approach in many state courts. See infra notes 29-30 & 156 and accompanying
text. That said, federal class-certification standards remain murky, and two even
more recent decisions-Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans, 133 S. Ct.
1184 (2013) and Comcast Corporationv. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)-leave
many questions unanswered. See infra note 30.
24. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (creating federal jurisdiction for class actions for
which, among other things, any class member is diverse from any defendant and
the aggregate amount in controversy is greater than $5 million).
27. See id. § 1453(b) (allowing any defendant to remove a class action from
state court without the consent of the other defendants even if one or more
defendants are citizens of the state where the case is filed).
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Federal Rule 23 tended to be less willing to certify class actions than
state judges applying state law on class certification. 28 However
strong this perception was when CAFA was enacted in 2005, it may
have become even stronger with the Supreme Court's 2011 decision
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,2 9 which found that a nationwide
class action alleging employment discrimination failed even to
satisfy Rule 23(a)'s requirement that there be a "question[] of law or
fact common to the class."30
28. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,supra note 23, at 1179 ("The
conventional wisdom today . .. is that many state courts are more welcoming of
class actions than federal courts."); see also, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 66 (2000) (discussing interviews with attorneys who
noted that they "were filing more state than federal class actions in response to
perceived animus towards class actions by federal judges"); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 in HistoricalContext: A PreliminaryView,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1522-23 (2008) [hereinafter Burbank, A Preliminary
View] ("Some state courts were certifying multistate classes because they shared
the commitments of the federal rulemakers in 1966, because they believed that
either one state's law or a manageable group of state laws could and should be
applied, and because they otherwise thought certification appropriate under their
governing rules."); Neal Miller, An EmpiricalStudy ofForum Choices in Removal
Cases Under Diversity and FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REV. 369,
391 n.101 (1992) ("The federal rules for class certification may be more restrictive
than those used by many state courts. Hence, defense attorneys may seek removal
to limit the possibility of a class action suit." (citations omitted)); Alan B.
Morrison, Removing Class Actions to FederalCourt: A Better Way to Handle the
Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1528-29 (2005)
("Federal judges are no longer seen as friends of plaintiffs, or at least no longer
perceived in damages class actions to be so preferable that lawyers prefer to file in
federal rather than state court.

. .

. [T]here can be little doubt that, in general,

defense counsel look on having a federal judge in a case as a plus, whereas counsel
for plaintiffs, not surprisingly, take the opposite view."); Martha Neil, New Route
for Class Actions: Proposals Raise Questions About Whether Giving Federal
Courts More Power Over Cases Will Cure the System's Ills, 89 A.B.A. J. 48, 50
(2003) ("Federal judges are widely viewed as being less lenient toward class
actions than their colleagues in the state courts, particularly on the key issue of
whether to certify a class so the case may proceed."). For additional examples of
state courts that adopt a more permissive approach to class certification, see
Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?,supra note 23, at 278-80 & nn.222-24.
29. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
30. See id. at 2550-57 (holding, by a 5-4 vote, that the plaintiffs "have not
established the existence of any common question" for purposes of Rule 23(a)).
Many have expressed concern that Wal-Mart imposes an unduly restrictive
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For one example of this federalism dynamic, look no further
than Smith v. Bayer Corp., which the Supreme Court decided just
days before Wal-Mart. In Smith, a federal court sought to block a
West Virginia state court from certifying a class action, on the
grounds that the federal court had already denied certification of a
class that "mirrored" the one being pursued in West Virginia.32 The
Supreme Court reversed the injunction, concluding that the
injunction did not qualify under the "relitigation exception" to the
Anti-Injunction Act.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan reasoned that
certification of a class action under West Virginia law was not the
"same issue" as certification of a class action under federal law. The
West Virginia Supreme Court had "declar[ed] its independence from
federal courts' interpretation of the Federal Rules-and particularly

approach to class certification. See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court's
Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 1015 (2012); Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class
Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 533 (2012). It is worth noting, however, that two
more recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the contours of federal classcertification standards remain quite murky. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), the Supreme Court affirmed (by a 6-3
vote) certification of a securities class action, id. at 1194-97, with Justice Thomas
arguing in dissent that the majority's reasoning contravened Wal-Mart. See e.g.,
id. at 1211-12 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.). In
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), the Supreme Court
reversed (by a 5-4 vote) certification of an antitrust class action, id. at 1432-33,
with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer arguing in dissent that the plaintiffs' failure to
challenge a key issue meant that "[t]he Court's ruling is good for this day and case
only" and that "it remains the 'black letter rule' that a class may obtain
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class
predominate over damages questions unique to class members." Id. at 1437
(Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
31. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
32. Id. at 2377 ("The class Smith proposed in state court mirrored the class
McCollins sought to certify in federal court.").
33. Id. at 2375 ("This case involves the last of the Act's three exceptions,
known as the relitigation exception."); id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283) ("The AntiInjunction Act, first enacted in 1793, provides that 'A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."')).
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of Rule 23."34 In the case of In re West Virginia Rezulin
Litigation,35 the West Virginia Supreme Court stated explicitly that it
sought "to avoid having our legal analysis of our Rules amount to
nothing more than Pavlovian responses to federal decisional law." 36
As Justice Kagan noted in her Smith opinion:
[T]he West Virginia Supreme Court has disapproved
the approach to Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement that the Federal District Court embraced.
Recall that the federal court held that the presence of
a single individualized issue-injury from the use of
Baycol-prevented class certification. The court did
not identify the common issues in the case; nor did it
balance these common issues against the need to
prove individual injury to determine which
predominated. The court instead applied a strict test
barring class treatment when proof of each plaintiffs
injury is necessary. By contrast, the West Virginia
Supreme Court in In re Rezulin adopted an all-thingsconsidered, balancing inquiry in interpreting its Rule
23. Rejecting any "rigid test," the state court opined
that the predominance requirement "contemplates a
review of many factors." Indeed, the court noted, a
"'single common issue' in a case could outweigh
'numerous . . . individual questions.'" That meant,
the court further explained (quoting what it termed the
"leading treatise" on the subject), that even objections
or
"'based
on ... causation,
to certification
reliance"'-which typically involve showings of
individual injury-"'will not bar predominance
satisfaction."' So point for point, the analysis set out
in In re Rezulin diverged from the District Court's
interpretation of Federal Rule 23.
34. Id. at 2377.
35. 585 S.E.2d 52 (2003).
36. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting In re Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 72
(citations and emphasis omitted)).
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It has long been a fact of life, then, that the choice between
state and federal court can have a significant effect on the likelihood
that a class action will be certified.3 8 And CAFA's legislative
history makes clear that its purpose was to allow defendants in highstakes class actions to choose federal court and thus to have class
certification decided by federal judges pursuant to federal law, rather
than by state judges pursuant to state law. 39 The presumption was
that federal courts exercising CAFA's new form of diversity
jurisdiction could indeed apply federal class-certification standards
rather than state class-certification standards to CAFA cases.40 This
premise has a potentially potent adversary, however, in the Erie
doctrine.
Interestingly, CAFA's legislative history recognized that Erie
and its progeny would apply to CAFA cases, just as Erie applies to
all cases that end up in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.41
The Senate Report states that CAFA "does not change the
application of the Erie Doctrine." 42 Yet there is significant tension
here. CAFA was purposefully designed to enable forum shopping,

38. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)
("Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law. Classification of a law as 'substantive' or
'procedural' for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor."). Early on,
some commentators suggested that CAFA should be read to overrule Erie. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2008) ("The enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (CAFA) is a congressional pronouncement implying that the Erie
Doctrine is seriously erroneous."). But there is nothing in CAFA's text to suggest
such a result. While CAFA expanded federal diversity jurisdiction, "expanding
federal jurisdiction does not eliminate the Erie problem; it is federal jurisdiction,
after all, that creates the potential for an Erie problem." Steinman, What Is the
Erie Doctrine?,supra note 23, at 299. And CAFA's legislative history states quite
clearly that Erie would apply in CAFA cases. See infra note 42. In any event,
Shady Grove confirms that the standard Erie analysis applies to CAFA cases as
well. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (noting that all nine Shady
Grove Justices applied the Erie-REA framework dating back to Hanna v. Plumer).
42. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46;
see also Burbank, A PreliminaryView, supra note 28 ("CAFA does not purport to
change Erie jurisprudence.").
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while Erie explicitly seeks to discourage forum shopping.4 3 The
way Erie discourages forum shopping, of course, is to require the
federal court to act like "a State court a block away."44 Applied to
CAFA, that notion would yield an ironic result. CAFA would bring
state court class actions into federal court. But then Erie would
insist that the federal court follow the same state-court approach to
class certification that CAFA was meant to evade.
To be sure, the Erie doctrine is not exclusively about forum
shopping, especially when one turns to the branch of Erie 's progeny
that deals with Federal Rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling
Act (REA). The next Sections of this Article will unpack the
Erie/REA framework and its potential application to class
certification. The Supreme Court began this endeavor in its recent
decision in Shady Grove, but it generated a fractured decision that
leaves many crucial questions still unanswered.

III.

SHADY GROVE

Shady Grove involved § 901(b) of New York's Civil Practice
Law and Rules, which provides that actions to recover certain kinds
of statutory penalties "may not be maintained as a class action." 45
The plaintiff, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, brought a class
action in federal court against Allstate for failing to pay insurance
benefits in a timely manner, invoking CAFA's expanded form of
diversity jurisdiction over class actions. 46 According to the lower
court, the statutory interest penalties sought by the Shady Grove

43. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (noting "the twin aims of
the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws").
44. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
45. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2009) ("Unless a statute creating or
imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the
recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum
measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a
class action.").
46. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d
137, 140 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) ("Shady Grove invoked the
district court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) .... .").
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class would have triggered § 901(b)'s prohibition on class actions if
the case had been in New York state court. 47
Class certification would have a huge impact on the liability
Allstate faced in Shady Grove. While Shady Grove's individual
claim was worth no more than $500, the claims on behalf of the
entire class could reach more than $5,000,000.48 Allstate argued that
New York's § 901(b) was binding in a federal court diversity action
under Erie and the Rules Enabling Act (REA) and, therefore,
precluded class certification.4 9 Shady Grove argued that class
certification should be decided in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23; if the elements of Rule 23 were satisfied, the
class should be certified regardless of whether a class action would
be allowed in state court. 50
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Federal Rule 23
governed whether the class should be certified; it was not displaced
by New York's § 901(b). 1 The Court divided 5-4, and, as
explained below, there was no majority opinion as to certain issues.
The five Justices in the majority were Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Sotomayor. 52 Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor.5 3 Justice Stevens

47. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[Section] 901(b) of the C.P.L.R. disallows
maintenance of a class action when the statute under which the action is being
brought imposes a penalty. The two percent monthly interest imposed by §
5106(a), and sought by the plaintiffs, is such a penalty. . . ."), rev'd on other
grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
48. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If Shady
Grove had filed suit in New York state court, the 2% interest payment
authorized ... as a penalty for overdue benefits would, by Shady Grove's own
measure, amount to no more than $500. By instead filing in federal court based on
the parties' diverse citizenship and requesting class certification, Shady Grove
hopes to recover, for the class, statutory damages of more than $5,000,000.").
49. Brief for Respondent, Shady Grove v. Allstate, No. 08-1008, 2009 WL
2777648, at *10-12 (Aug. 28, 2009).
50. Brief for Petitioner, Shady Grove v. Allstate, No. 08-1008, 2009 WL
2040421, at *9-12 (July 10, 2009).
51. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
52. Id. at 1436.
53. Id. Justice Sotomayor did not join Part II-C of Justice Scalia's opinion,
which offered "[a] few words in response to [Justice Stevens's] concurrence." Id.
at 1444 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.).
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joined Justice Scalia's opinion in part and wrote a separate
concurrence that appeared to be more receptive to state law than
Justice Scalia's approach. 5 4 In dissent were Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, who joined a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Ginsburg that would have required the federal
court to follow New York's § 90 1(b). 5 5
Putting aside the nuances of Erie and the REA, Shady Grove
is a fascinating decision. First, it was a case where state law was
more hostile to class certification than federal law.5 6 Thus, the
posture of Shady Grove inverted the conventional wisdom, under
which plaintiffs seeking class certification generally wish to avoid
the prevailing federal approach. That was certainly the conventional
wisdom that prompted CAFA.5 In this sense, Shady Grove is quite
similar to Erie itself. One of the great ironies of Erie is that its bigbusiness litigant-the Erie Railroad Company-preferred state law
over federal common law for that particular case.5 8 Typically, the
kind of general federal common law that Erie ultimately forbade
worked to the advantage of corporate litigants. 59 So, even though
Justice Brandeis was no friend of early twentieth-century corporate
America, it came as no surprise that he decided Erie the way he did.
A second remarkable characteristic of Shady Grove is the
Justices' unusual voting pattern. Shady Grove is the only decision
where this particular 5-4 split ever occurred: Roberts, Scalia,
Sotomayor, Stevens, and Thomas in the majority, and Alito, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Kennedy in the dissent. 60 The most coherent principle

54. See infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
55. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460, 1468-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 1439 (majority opinion) (noting that § 901(b) prevents certain
kinds of class actions "from coming into existence at all").
57. See supra Part II (discussing the logic and goals of CAFA).
58. See Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 255 ("Erie
argued that liability was governed by Pennsylvania law [as defined by] decisions
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. . . .").
59. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION 52-55 (2000); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY
TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 598 (2d ed. 2008).
60. SCOTUSblog Final Stats OT09, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-07071
01.pdf. These nine Justices were on the Court together only for the October 2009
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to explain the Shady Grove breakdown may be that the Justices
divided along strict alphabetical lines.61
It is also noteworthy that Justice Scalia-by refusing to apply
New York's categorical bar-took a position that was more
favorable to certifying the Shady Grove class action. It even led The
Wall Street Journal to ask: "Is Scalia Getting Soft on Plaintiffs?" 62
Meanwhile, Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion that
would have blocked the Shady Grove class action. One year later,
these two Justices would square off on more predictable sides of a
5-4 split in Wal-Mart, with Justice Scalia writing a majority opinion
rejecting class certification and Justice Ginsburg writing a partial
dissent.
term. Justice Souter (not Justice Sotomayor) was still on the Court for the October
2008 Term, and Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens for the October 2010
Term.
61. The five Justices whose last names are in the second half of the alphabet
were in the Shady Grove majority, while the four whose last names are in the first
half of the alphabet dissented. Five-to-four splits along alphabetical lines appear
to be a rare occurrence. SCOTUSblog's StatPack reveals that it did not happen at
all during the Court's 2010 or 2011 Terms. See SCOTUSblog Final Stats OTH,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
30,
2012),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SB-five-to-fourOTIlfinal.pdf;
SCOTUSblog Final
Stats OT10, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/SBOT 10_stat_pack final.pdf.
62. Ashby Jones, The Shady Grove Case: Is Scalia Getting Soft on Plaintiffs?
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 1, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/0l/theshady-grove-case-is-scalia-getting-soft-on-plaintiffs.
More recent decisions
suggest an answer to this question: no, he is not. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432-35 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that an antitrust
class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3)); Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-61 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (reversing certification of an
employment-discrimination class action because there was no question of law or
fact common to the class for purposes of FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2)); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744-53 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act required enforcement of an arbitration agreement's class
action waiver, even if that provision would be unconscionable under California
law); see also Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (2010) (Scalia, J., in
chambers as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit) (granting stay of execution of a
$250 million class judgment against Philip Morris pending consideration of
petition for certiorari challenging the judgment as violating the defendants' "dueprocess right to an opportunity to present every available defense" and stating that
it was "significantly possible that the judgment below will be reversed").
63. Compare Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547-61 (majority opinion by Scalia,
J.), with id. at 2561-67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting with respect to Rule 23(a)(2)).
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One possible explanation for these counterintuitive positions
is that, as described above, Shady Grove was a case where state law
was more hostile to class actions than federal law. In insisting on
federal law, Justice Scalia may have been thinking ahead to the
situation where a plaintiff seeks to transplant a more lenient state
court approach to class certification into federal court. And Justice
Ginsburg may have been contemplating that scenario as well, just
with a different set of policy preferences.
But enough with attitudinalism. Let us turn to how the three
Shady Grove opinions-Justice Scalia's opinion (which was a
majority opinion on some issues and a plurality on others), Justice
Stevens's concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg's dissent-navigated
the doctrinal waters of Erie and the REA. Although the Justices in
Shady Grove were sharply divided, all agreed on the basic
framework for analyzing vertical choice-of-law questions under Erie
and the REA. 64 This framework dates back to Hanna v. Plumer,665
when Chief Justice Warren articulated the bifurcated approach to
Erie that prevails to this day. 66
The test for choosing between state and federal law hinges on
whether the particular issue is "covered by one of the Federal Rules
[of Civil Procedure]" or, alternatively, presents a "typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice." 67 Where an issue "is covered by one of the

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion is similar in this regard; Justice Scalia wrote a
majority opinion allowing arbitration agreements to block access to class-wide
relief, while Justice Ginsburg and the Wal-Mart dissenters joined a dissent
authored by Justice Breyer that would have read the Federal Arbitration Act to
permit challenges to such arbitration provisions under state contract law. Compare
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744-53 (majority opinion by Scalia, J.), with id. at
1756-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court's 2013 decision in Comcast v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), has the same breakdown. See supra note 30.
64. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,supra note 23, at 1137-38.
65. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
66. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1134-35
("The modem Erie doctrine's basic framework has been fairly well established
since the Court's 1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer." (footnotes omitted)).
67. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (stating that where "a situation is covered by one
of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical,
relatively unguided Erie choice"). Some commentators refer to the former
category as the "Hanna prong" and the latter category as the "RDA prong" (after

664
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Federal Rules," the federal court must apply that Federal Rule unless
the Rule violates either the REA (the statutory authority for the
Federal Rules) or the U.S. Constitution.68 The REA provides that
such rules must be "general rules of practice and procedure" 69 and
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 70 In the
so-called "unguided" Erie situation, the court's choice between state
and federal law must vindicate "the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws." 71 If following the federal standard

the Rules of Decision Act). See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the
State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1637, 1637 (1998).
68. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. An Erie choice might also be guided by a
federal statute. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988) ("A
district court's decision whether to apply a federal statute . . .involves a
considerably less intricate analysis than that which governs the 'relatively
unguided Erie choice."' (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471)); id. ("[W]hen the
federal law sought to be applied is a congressional statute, the first and chief
question for the district court's determination is whether the statute is 'sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the court."' (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980))). In such cases, federal courts must follow
the federal statute on point unless it is unconstitutional. Id. at 27.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
70. Id. § 2072(b).
A Federal Rule must also comply with the U.S.
Constitution, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72, but the constitutional constraints on
rulemaking are generally thought to be no greater than those imposed by the REA
itself. See, e.g., Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 269 n.167
(explaining why the constitutional limits to which Hanna referred "place no
greater constraint on rulemaking than the Rules Enabling Act's substantive-rights
provision").
71. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. Earlier Supreme Court decisions had been read
to suggest that an unguided Erie choice required federal courts to balance state and
federal interests. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the
Litigation Matrix, 51 DuKE L.J. 561, 598 (2001) ("In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, [356 U.S. 525 (1958),] for example, the Court employed a
balancing test, contrasting the federal judicial system's procedural interest in using
its own processes against the state's interest in having the federal court employ the
state's procedures when enforcing substantive state law." (footnote omitted)). It is
unclear whether such balancing is still a necessary part of the analysis after Hanna.
See, e.g., Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 267-69 & n.153
(noting that the interest-balancing "aspect of Byrd was ignored by the Supreme
Court for the better part of forty years" and questioning whether it had been
revived by Gasperini'sambivalent reference to "countervailing federal interests").
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"would disserve these two policies," then the federal court must
follow state law. 72
A.

Forum Shopping

One of the most interesting aspects of Shady Grove is the one
issue on which the Justices all agreed-that differences between
state and federal approaches to class certification do, indeed, lead to
the kind of forum shopping that would be forbidden under the
"unguided" branch of Erie's framework. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia stated, "We must acknowledge the reality that keeping
the federal-court door open to class actions that cannot proceed in
state court will produce forum shopping."73 Justice Stevens joined
that part of Scalia's opinion, and he also recognized in his
concurrence that the availability of a class action "is relevant to the
forum shopping considerations that are part of the Rules of Decision
Act or Erie inquiry." 74 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the four
dissenters, concluded that "forum shopping will undoubtedly result if
a plaintiff need only file in federal instead of state court to seek a
massive monetary award explicitly barred by state law."7 5 Noting
that "Shady Grove seeks class relief that is ten thousand times
greater than the individual remedy available to it in state court,"7 6
Justice Ginsburg reasoned, "It is difficult to imagine a scenario that
would promote more forum shopping than one in which the
difference between filing in state and federal court is the difference
between a potential award of $500 and one of $5,000,000."77
The unanimity on this issue should come as no surprisecertainly not to the drafters of CAFA. It was CAFA's fundamental
premise that disparities in how state and federal courts decide class

72. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6.
73. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1447 (2010) (Scalia, J.).
74. Id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1471 n.13.
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certification encouraged forum shopping.78 With respect to the Erie
doctrine, therefore, the dispositive questions in Shady Grove were
(1) does Rule 23 "control" whether a class action is available; and
(2) if so, in what circumstances would it abridge, enlarge, or modify
substantive rights to allow Rule 23 to displace state practice?
B.

Control, Conflict, and Collision

The threshold question that the Erie doctrine poses has been
framed in a number of ways: whether the particular issue is "covered
by one of the Federal Rules" 79; "whether the scope of the Federal
Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the
Court"8 0 ; whether the Federal Rule "answers the question in
dispute" 8 1 ; whether there is a "'direct collision' between the Federal
Rule and the state law" 82; whether the "clash" between state law and
a Federal Rule is "unavoidable." 83 If the answer to these questions is
yes, then the federal court is not making a "typical, relatively
unguided Erie choice" 84 and, accordingly, the potential for vertical
forum shopping is not sufficient to require the federal court to follow
state law. Rather, the applicability of state law will hinge on the
REA's substantive-rights provision, which shows less deference to
state law than Erie's "twin aims."

78. See S. REP. No. 109-14, supra n.8 at 4, 9, 23 (emphasizing that lawyers
could "game" state courts, arguing federal forums are more "even-handed," and
criticizing the potential for forum shopping).
79. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); accord Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) ("Concerning matters covered by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the characterization question is usually
unproblematic: It is settled that if the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules
Enabling Act . . . the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law."

(emphasis added)).
80. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980).
81. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1437 (2010) (Scalia, J.).
82. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472).
83. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
84. Id. at 471.
85. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Scalia, J.) ("The short of the matter
is that a Federal Rule governing procedure is valid whether or not it alters the
outcome of the case in a way that induces forum shopping. To hold otherwise
would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress's exercise of it." (internal quotation marks omitted));
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Indeed, this threshold question is what transformed Shady
Grove from a 9-0 decision in favor of state law to a 5-4 decision in
favor of federal law. Justice Scalia's opinion garnered a five-Justice
majority (which included Justice Stevens) on this issue. 86 Scalia
explained that Federal Rule 23 "answers the question in dispute," 87
because "Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any
federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule's
New York's § 901(b) "undeniably
prerequisites are met.""
answer[s] the same question as Rule 23: whether a class action may
proceed for a given suit." 89 Accordingly, Rule 23 and § 901(b)
"flatly contradict each other," meaning that the Court must "confront
head-on" whether Rule 23 satisfies the REA. 90 If Rule 23 passes
muster, then it would trump New York law "whether or not it alters
the outcome of the case in a way that induces forum shopping." 9 1
The four dissenters, however, concluded that "Rule 23 does
not collide with § 901(b)." 92 As Justice Ginsburg explained: "Rule
23 prescribes the considerations relevant to class certification and
postcertification proceedings-but it does not command that a
particular remedy be available when a party sues in a representative
capacity. Section 901(b), in contrast, trains on that latter issue." 93
Phrased another way: "Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class

Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 310 ("A guided Erie
choice-one where the federal standard is set forth in positive federal law such as
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure-is supposed to be more favorable to federal
lawmaking than an unguided Erie choice.").
86. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (noting that Part 1I-A of Justice Scalia's
opinion was "the opinion of the Court").
87. Id. at 1437.
88. Id. at 1442; see also id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("When the District Court in the case before us was
asked to certify a class action, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 squarely
governed the determination whether the court should do so. That is the explicit
function of Rule 23.").
89. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J.); see also id. at 1437 (holding that § 901(b) "states
that Shady Grove's suit 'may not be maintained as a class action' because of the
relief it seeks" (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b))).
90. Id. at 1441-42.
91. Id. at 1448.
92. Id. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1465-66 (citations omitted).

668

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 32:4

litigation, but allows [§ 901(b)] to control the size of a monetary
award a class plaintiff may pursue.

. .

. Rule 23 describes a method

of enforcing a claim for relief, while § 901(b) defines the dimensions
of the claim itself."94 For the dissenters, then, there was "no
unavoidable conflict between Rule 23 and § 901(b)," and state law
must prevail if "application of the state rule would have so important
an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure
to appi it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal
court.'
C.

Substantive Rights and the REA

Because a majority held that Shady Grove did not present a
"typical, relatively unguided Erie choice," 96 the unanimous
conclusion about the potential for forum shopping did not require the
federal court to apply New York law. Rather, the dispositive issue
was whether applying Rule 23 would "abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive rights" in violation of the REA.97 There was no
majority opinion on the REA, however. The REA portion of Justice
Scalia's opinion was joined only by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Sotomayor and Thomas. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
concurrence on this issue, taking a position that is ostensibly more
deferential to state law than the plurality's approach. 98 But all five
Justices in the majority agreed on the ultimate conclusion: applying
Rule 23 in Shady Grove did not violate the REA's substantive-rights
provision.9 9

94. Id. at 1466.
95. Id. at 1469 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965)
(brackets omitted)).
96. Hanna,380 U.S. at 471.

97. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
98. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
99. Justice Ginsburg and the Shady Grove dissenters did not apply the REA's
substantive-rights provision, given their conclusion that Rule 23 and § 901(b) did
not conflict. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. Accordingly, they
"did not confront either the debate between Justices Scalia and Stevens on the
proper construction of the REA, or whether it would violate the REA to allow Rule
23 to trump New York's section 90 1(b)." Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,
supra note 23, at 1141.
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Justice Scalia's plurality opinion reasoned that a Rule is not
invalid simply because it "affects a litigant's substantive rights." 00
Rather, the REA forbids a Federal Rule that "alters the rules of
decision by which the court will adjudicate those rights."10 But if
the Rule "governs only 'the manner and the means' by which the
litigants' rights are 'enforced,' it is valid."'10 2 Channeling the Court's
1941 decision in Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, 0 3 Scalia stated that
the REA's substantive rights provision "means that the Rule must
'really regulat[e] procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them."' 0 4 It follows from this premise that what matters is "the
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule" and "not the
substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected state
law." 105
Applying these principles, Justice Scalia concluded that Rule
23 did not violate the REA:
[W]e think it obvious that rules allowing multiple
claims (and claims by or against multiple parties) to
be litigated together are. . . valid. Such rules neither

change plaintiffs' separate entitlements to relief nor
abridge defendants' rights; they alter only how the
claims are processed. For the same reason, Rule 23at least insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join
their separate claims against the same defendants in a
class action-falls within § 2072(b)'s authorization.
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of
which it is a species), merely enables a federal court
to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once,

100. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added).
101. Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446
(1946)).
103. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
104. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)) (alteration in original).
105. Id. at 1444.
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instead of in separate suits. And like traditional
joinder, it leaves the parties' legal rights and duties
intact and the rules of decision unchanged.1 06
Justice Stevens sought to contrast his approach with Justice
Scalia's.1 07 He wrote that, under the REA, a Federal Rule "cannot
govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law
that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of
the state-created right."108
This inquiry requires courts "to
distinguish between procedural rules adopted for some policy reason
and seemingly procedural rules that are intimately bound up in the
scope of a substantive right or remedy."1 0 9
Justice Stevens concluded that New York's § 901(b) did not
qualify for protection under his approach to the REA. He recognized
that some of § 901(b)'s legislative history "can be read to suggest
that the New York officials who supported § 901(b) wished to create
a limitation on New York's statutory damages," 10 and that
"§ 901(b) was 'apparently' adopted in response to fears that the class
action procedure, applied to statutory penalties, would lead to
'annihilating punishment of the defendant.""
But he determined
that this was "not particularly strong evidence that § 901(b) serves to
define who can obtain a statutory penalty or that certifying such a
class would enlarge New York's remedy," noting that "[a]ny device
that makes litigation easier makes it easier for plaintiffs to recover

106. Id. at 1443 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Justice Scalia believes that the
sole Enabling Act question is whether the federal rule 'really regulates procedure,'
which means, apparently, whether it regulates 'the manner and the means by which
the litigants' rights are enforced.' I respectfully disagree." (citation omitted)
(quoting id. at 1442, 1444-46 & n.13 (Scalia, J.)); id. at 1453 ("Although the
plurality appears to agree with much of my interpretation of § 2072, it nonetheless
rejects that approach for two reasons, both of which are mistaken." (citation
omitted) (citing id. at 1445-46 (Scalia, J.)).
108. Id. at 1452.
109. Id. at 1458 (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 1457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 1458 (quoting V. ALEXANDER, PRACTICE COMMENTARIES,
C901:11, reprinted in 7B McKINNEY's CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANN.
104 (2006)).
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damages."ll2 To view § 901(b) as defining a "'limited' damages
remedy" under New York law would "rest on extensive speculation
about what the New York Legislature had in mind when it created
§ 901(b)."" Rather, § 901(b) should be understood as "a classically
procedural calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in New
York courts (under any source of law) only when it is necessary to
do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is not
required.""14 This view would "respect the plain textual reading of
§ 901(b)."" 5

IV.

AFTER SHADY GROVE: THE CONTINUING ROLE OF STATE
CLASS ACTION LAW IN FEDERAL COURT

Going forward, there remain two potential ways that federal
courts might be required to follow state class action practice, even
after Shady Grove. First, courts might determine that state law is
relevant in a way that does not create a conflict with Rule 23. If so,
then Shady Grove's unanimous view that disparate approaches to
class certification encourage vertical forum shopping would compel
the conclusion that federal courts must follow state law under Erie.
Second, courts might determine that it would violate the REA to
disregard state law, because doing so would abridge, enlarge, or
modify substantive rights. Sections A & B of this Part explain how
these arguments remain viable after Shady Grove.
There is, of course, some debate about whether Shady Grove
leaves any room for state class-certification standards in federal
court.116 But ultimately, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Or
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 1459.
Id.
Id. at 1460.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1023 (2011) (arguing that "Shady Grove, if
realistically read, dashed [the] prediction" that "state law would govern ... class
certification" (citing Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at
284-86)). But cf id. at 1023 n.170 (stating that Steinman, Our Class Action
Federalism, supra note 23, at 1144-54, "skillfully salvages the remnants of this
approach after Shady Grove's hurricane-force winds").
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to channel Justice Holmes, Shady Grove ultimately means what
subsequent courts say it means. 1 17 As described in Part C, numerous
courts after Shady Grove have concluded that Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act require federal courts to follow state law relating to
class actions.
A.

When the Conflict Might Not Be Necessary

With a hat tip to Roger Traynor, Justice Ginsburg's Shady
Grove dissent observed that "[o]ur decisions .. . caution us to ask,
before undermining state legislation: Is this conflict really
necessary?"" 8 Even the Shady Grove majority agreed with the basic
premise that Federal Rules should be construed to avoid conflicts if
possible.11 9 The majority ultimately concluded that Rule 23
"answers the uestion" of "whether a class action may proceed for a
given suit." 2 But it failed to consider-and certainly does not
refute-the possibility that conflicts with state law can be avoided by
allowing state law to play a role in the application of Rule 23. This
argument was not presented in Shady Grove,121 and it remains
viable.

117. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
118. 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is
This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959)).
119. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441 n.7 (majority opinion) (stating that
"we entirely agree" that "we should read an ambiguous Federal Rule to avoid
'substantial variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation'
(alteration in original) (quoting Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 504 (2001)); see also id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[F]ederal rules must be interpreted with some
degree of 'sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies."'
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc, 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7)); id. at 1456
("I agree with Justice Ginsburg that courts should 'avoi[d] immoderate
interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on state prerogatives' and
should in some instances 'interpre[t] the federal rules to avoid conflict with
important state regulatory policies."' (alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting id. at 1461-62 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
120. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-39.
121. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1161
("[S]tate class action law can be relevant in ways that Shady Grove did not
consider and that would not create the kind of direct conflict with Rule 23 that was
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Rule 23 requires all class actions to satisfy the four elements
listed in Rule 23(a)-"numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation"'22_and at least one of the conditions

set forth in Rule 23(b). Many of today's most controversial class
actions (including Shady Grove) invoke Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires that "questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."' 23
Rule 23(b)(3)'s elements often prove dispositive in classcertification decisions. 124 The Supreme Court's Wal-Mart decision
appears to make Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement a more
formidable obstacle to class certification as well. 125 But the
generalized language of Rule 23 provides no precise formula for
assessing these requirements.1 26 To be sure, federal courts-

the foundation of the Shady Grove majority's decision. Questions remain,
therefore, whether the Court would reach the same result in a case where the
litigant invoked state class action law . .. in applying Rule 23.").
122. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. These elements are shorthand for
Rule 23(a)'s requirements that "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
123. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
124. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir.
1996) ("The district court erred in its analysis in two distinct ways. First, it failed
to consider how variations in state law affect predominance and superiority.
Second, its predominance inquiry did not include consideration of how a trial on
the merits would be conducted. Each of these defects mandates reversal.
Moreover, at this time, while the tort is immature, the class complaint must be
dismissed, as class certification cannot be found to be a superior method of
adjudication."); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action
Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1475, 1475-76, 1479 n.17 (2005) (noting
that "Rule 23(b)(3) is the reef upon which most class certification efforts flounder"
and arguing that federal courts have "transformed [Rule] 23(b)(3)'s 'superiority'
requirement into a mandate of perfection").
125. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
126. Rule 23 does provide a nonexhaustive list of factors that are "pertinent"
to the superiority inquiry: "(A) the class members' interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
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including the Supreme Court-might attempt to define these vague
terms more precisely and thereby constrain the leeway federal courts
have going forward. Or, in any given case, a federal court might
apply those ambiguous terms in ways that are more or less receptive
toward class certification. To what extent does the Erie-REA
framework prevent federal courts from making these choices in ways
that would override state class action law?
Supreme Court case law indicates that a federal court's
decision to interpret or apply a vague Federal Rule in a way that
would displace state law is, in Hanna's words, a "relatively unguided
Erie choice."' 27 There is a difference, therefore, between state law
conflicting with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (which triggers
the REA's "substantive rights" standard) and state law conflicting
with the federal judiciary's gloss on a Federal Rule whose text
provides only a vague or ambiguous standard (which triggers the
more state-friendly "twin-aims" standard). If the vague standard set
forth in the Federal Rule can be applied in a way that is consistent
with state law, then the Federal Rule does not truly collide with state
law.
The strongest example of this idea is Gasperini v. Centerfor
Humanities, Inc.
The issue in Gasperini was whether a federal
court must follow New York's standard for determining whether a
federal jury's damage award was so excessive as to require a new
trial.129 There was no doubt that Federal Rule 59 governed a posttrial motion challenging a damage award as excessive.1 30 And

of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). These open-ended considerations do not
foreclose the incorporation of state law into the superiority analysis. See
Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,supra note 23, at 1150-51.
127. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).

128.

518 U.S. 415 (1996).

129. See id. at 418-19 (noting that New York law allows courts "to order
new trials when the jury's award deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation" and stating that "the issue we confront in this case" is
whether that provision applies "in an action based on New York law but tried in
federal court by reason of the parties' diverse citizenship").
130. See id. at 437 n.22 ("Rule 59(a) is as encompassing as it is
uncontroversial."); see also id. at 420 (noting that the defendant had "[moved] for
a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59").
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federal courts had read Rule 59 to authorize new trials where a
damage award was so excessive as to "shock the conscience."l31
Gasperini, however, held that Rule 59 itself did not impose
the shock-the-conscience standard that had long applied in federal
court: "Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be
governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that governance
other than the law that gives rise to the claim for relief-here, the
law of New York."l32 It thus rejected the idea that Rule 59 created
"a 'federal standard' for new trial motions in 'direct collision' with,
and 'leaving no room for the operation of,' a state law like [New
The shock-the-conscience standard was a kind of
York's]." 33
federal procedural common law, not a standard dictated by Rule 59
Therefore, the choice between the federal shock-theitself.13
conscience standard and the applicable state standard was an
unguided one. And in Gasperini, the Court held that federal courts
hearing a claim arising under New York law must follow New
York's standard, because to do otherwise would contravene Erie's
twin aims by generating "substantial variations between state and
federal [money judgments]." 35
Gasperini's reasoning applies with equal force to the
relationship between Rule 23 and state class action law. Although
Rule 23 governs class certification in federal court, the Erie doctrine
may constrain the federal judiciary's ability to interpret Rule 23 in
ways that would displace state class action law in any given case.
Rule 23 itself does not dictate what qualify as "questions of law or
fact common to the class" for purposes of Rule 23(a),1 36 how to
assess whether those common issues "predominate" over individual
ones,137 or how to balance the costs and benefits of class treatment to

131. Id. at429-30& n.10.
132. Id. at 437 n.22.
133. Id. (quoting id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
134. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1146
("Gasperini ... held that Rule 59 itself did not impose the shock-the-conscience
standard that had long applied in federal court.").
135. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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determine whether a class action would be "superior" in any given
case.138 For a state law claim, state law could inform these inquiries,
just as it informs whether damages are so excessive as to justify a
new trial. To follow state law in this situation would not displace a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure; it would only displace the federal
judiciary's gloss on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. That choice,
therefore, does not implicate the REA's substantive-rights provision,
but rather the more state-friendly test for "unguided" Erie choices.' 39
Elsewhere, I have described these arguments as recognizing
that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has two dimensions-width
and depth.140 These dimensions refer to two distinct situations
where state law and a Federal Rule might coexist and, thereby, avoid
the kind of conflict, collision, or clash that triggers a REA analysis.
The more traditional example is where the Federal Rule is not wide
enough to displace state law. Consider Walker v. Armco Steel
Corporation,14 where the Supreme Court considered a potential
conflict between Rule 3's command that "[a] civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court" 1 42 and Oklahoma's
rule that merely filing a complaint did not toll the Oklahoma statute
of limitations. 4 3 Walker held that Rule 3 was too narrowto displace
state law on this issue: "Rule 3 governs the date from which various
timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not
affect state statutes of limitations." 4 4
Gasperini confirms that a conflict between a Federal Rule
and state law can also be avoided when the Federal Rule is too
shallow to displace state law. Rule 59 was unquestionably wide
enough to cover a post-trial motion challenging a damage award as
excessive-it authorized a new trial "for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal

138. Id.
139. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining that the REA's
substantive rights provision gives less deference to state law than the "twin aims"
test for unguided Erie choices); see also Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,
supra note 23, at 1146-47 (describing how the "logic of Gasperini" would apply
to Rule 23 and state class action law).
140. Id. at 1148.
141. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
142. Id. at 750 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3).
143. Id. at 742-43.
144. Id. at 751.
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court."14 5 But Rule 59 was not deep enough to displace the state law
standard for assessing whether a damage award was impermissibly
excessive.146 Likewise, Rule 23(b)(3)'s vague requirements of
commonality, predominance, and superiority are not necessarily
deep enough to displace state law on whether a particular class
action is permissible.14 7
This argument applies even if binding federal judicial
precedents mandate particular approaches to commonality,
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
146. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying notes.
147. As I have explained elsewhere, to ignore the "depth" dimension could
eviscerate the entire distinction between "guided" and "unguided" Erie choices.
See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1152-53. Rule
83(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "A judge may regulate
practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under [the Rules
Enabling Act], and the district's local rules." Id. at 1152. Rule 1 requires that the
Federal Rules "should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Id. Taken
together, REA-approved Federal Rules 1 and 83 mean that even if an issue does
not fall within the "width" of Federal Rules 2 through 80 (or some other federal
law), a federal court may regulate that issue subject only to the standard that its
approach secure the action's "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination." Id. at
1152-53. Thus, every issue would become a "guided" Erie choice governed by
the REA prong of Hanna's bifurcated approach. Id. When an issue falls within
the ambit of Federal Rules 2 through 80, any judicial gloss on that Federal Rule is
given the same preemptive effect as the Rule itself. When an issue is not within
the ambit of these Federal Rules, that issue is necessarily "covered by" Federal
Rules 1 and 83, which themselves would grant any judicial approach to that issue
the preemptive power of the Federal Rules. Id.
This approach would turn cases like Walker upside-down. See supra notes
141-144 and accompanying text. Rule 3 may not have covered whether filing of
the complaint "commenced" the action for limitations purposes. But absent some
other federal law to the contrary, Rule 3's silence would simply leave the court
free to regulate the issue pursuant to Rule 83 and Rule 1. Thus, a federal court
could choose tolling-by-filing as best suited to secure the action's "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination," and that federal approach could be set aside only
if it abridges, enlarges, or modifies substantive rights in violation of the REA. The
understanding of Gasperinithat I propose, on the other hand, would leave the logic
of Walker intact. Neither Rule 1 nor Rule 83 has sufficient depth to displace state
law, so the choice between tolling-by-filing and tolling-by-service would remain
an unguided Erie choice. A federal court would simply construe Rules 1 and 83 to
avoid any conflict with state law by adopting the state law's tolling principle, as
Walker requires.
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predominance, or superiority. The shock-the-conscience standard
for new-trial motions had also been well established by federal case
law.148 The operative question for Erie purposes is whether that
"law" is dictated by the Rule or by the judiciary's gloss on the Rule's
indeterminate text. If it is the latter, then the federal court is making
a "relatively, unguided Erie choice,"l 49 not one where applying state
law would conflict, clash, or collide with the Federal Rule itself. 10
Indeed, Justice Scalia's Shady Grove majority opinion
endorses the proposition that "we should read an ambiguous Federal
Rule to avoid substantial variations in outcomes between state and
federal litigation."' 5 1 We know that different approaches to class
certifications create the kind of "substantial variations" that run afoul
of Erie's twin aims-every Shady Grove Justice agreed on that
point. 152 Accordingly, ambiguous language in Rule 23 must be read
in ways to accommodate state-law approaches to class certification.
The contrast between the federal and West Virginia approaches to
class certification, which the Court outlined in Smith v. Bayer
The federal court had
Corp.,153 provides just one example.
not
satisfied
by "appl[ying] a strict
Rule
23(b)(3)
was
that
concluded
test barring class treatment when proof of each plaintiffs injury is
necessary."l 54 But West Virginia's approach to predominance
"[r]eject[s] any 'rigid test,"' noting that even "a 'single common

148. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422 (1996)
(noting the "judge-made formulation in responding to excessiveness attacks on
jury verdicts" according to which "courts would not disturb an award unless the
amount was so exorbitant that it 'shocked the conscience of the court' (citation
omitted)).
149. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
150. See Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 284
(arguing that "state law may dictate the precise contours of' a Federal Rule's
"generalized standard[] ... even where federal courts have developed their own
interpretation of the generalized standard ... , as federal courts had done with the
shock-the-conscience test for excessive verdicts").
151. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1441 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (internal alterations, citations, and quotation
marks omitted).
152. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing how West
Virginia's approach to class certification differs from those of some federal
courts).
154. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2378 (2011).
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issue' in a case could outweigh 'numerous .. . individual
questions."" 5 5 The upshot of the argument outlined above is that a
federal court considering a class action arising under West Virginia
law must read Rule 23's textually-ambiguous predominance
requirement as a West Virginia court would. One could imagine
similar arguments with respect to commonality, superiority, or other
aspects of Rule 23.156
B.

SubstantiveRights and the REA

Even if a conflict is unavoidable, Shady Grove leaves
considerable room for courts to decide that state class action law
implicates substantive rights to such an extent that it would violate
the REA to disregard it. Most significantly here, neither Justice
Scalia's nor Justice Stevens's approaches to the REA garner a
majority of Justices. And Justice Stevens's opinion empowers courts
to inquire whether "a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use
of the term" is nonetheless "so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created
right." 5 7 If so, it would violate the REA to allow Rule 23 to
displace state law on class actions. Although Justice Stevens writes
that "the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one,"' 5 8

155. Id. (citing and quoting In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 72
(2003) (internal citations omitted)).
156. Many state courts, for example, take a quite lenient approach to the
"common question" requirement when it comes to their state's class action rules.
See, e.g., North Dakota Human Rights Coalition v. Bertsch, 697 N.W.2d 1, 4 (N.D.
2005) ("[T]he requirement for common questions of law or fact is easily
satisfied."); Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 225 (Md. 2000) ("The
threshold of commonality is not a high one and is easily met in most cases.");
Berry v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 99 P.3d 1166, 1180 (N.M. App. 2004)
("The commonality requirement of Rule 1-023(A)(2) is relatively easily met.").
The approaches of these states seem a far cry from the Wal-Mart majority's view
of commonality for purposes of Federal Rule 23(a). See, e.g., Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) (concluding that "dissimilarities" among class
members meant that there was not "even a single common question" for purposes
of Rule 23(a)(2)) (brackets omitted).
157. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1452 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 1457.
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his approach invites a fairly open-ended examination of state law.
As described below, many federal courts have employed Justice
Stevens's approach to conclude that it would violate the REA to
disregard state class action law.' 5 9
In any event, both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens leave
unaddressed other arguments that allowing Rule 23 to displace state
class action law would impermissibly abridge, enlarge, or modify
substantive rights. One argument that Shady Grove never considered
is based on the inextricable link between class certification and
preclusion. Preclusion standards have long been viewed as beyond
the bounds of REA rulemaking.1 60 Of particular note is Justice
Scalia's opinion in Semtek InternationalIncorporatedv. Lockheed
Martin Corporation.161 The defendant in Semtek had argued that
Federal Rule 41(b) required particular dismissals by federal district
courts to have claim-preclusive effect on subsequent litigation.1 62
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia noted that it "would
seem to violate" the REA if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
imposed different preclusion consequences than state law would. 163

159. See infra notes 188-195 and accompanying text. For purposes of this
Article, it does not matter whether Justice Stevens's concurrence is Shady Grove's
binding holding under the so-called Marks rule, which provides that "[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds. . . ."' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.)); see infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text (citing federal
courts that have found Justice Stevens's opinion to be the Shady Grove holding).
Whether one follows Justice Stevens's opinion as the holding, or simply concludes
that the lack of a majority on this issue means there is no "holding" on the proper
approach to the REA, lower courts have considerable flexibility to conclude that
particular aspects of state class action law create substantive rights for purposes of
the REA.
160. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full
Faith and Credit and FederalCommon Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CORNELL L.
REv. 733, 764 (1986) ("[T]he Rules Enabling Act does not authorize Federal
Rules of preclusion.").
161. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
162. Id. at 501.
163. See id. at 503-04 ("In the present case, for example, if California law
left petitioner free to sue on this claim in Maryland even after the California statute
of limitations had expired, the federal court's extinguishment of that right (through
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What makes class actions such a powerful device (and one
that inspires such tenacious vertical forum shopping) is preclusion.
A class action judgment will bind the defendant vis-a-vis the entire
plaintiff class, regardless of whether each individual member of that
class has affirmatively stepped forward to pursue his or her claim.164
When a class is not certified, on the other hand, res judicata will bind
the defendant only as to the named plaintiffs who join the action.165
To allow class certification via Rule 23 in a case like Shady Grove
(where state law would forbid a class action) would give the ultimate
judgment much wider preclusive effect than it would have under a
state law that forbade such class actions. And to refuse class
certification via Federal Rule 23 in the more typical CAFA scenario
(where state law would permit a class action) would give the
ultimate judgment narrower preclusive effect than it would have
under state law.
Shady Grove does not speak to whether Rule 23 might violate
the REA because of its effect on state preclusion principles, and it
certainly does not foreclose this kind of argument. Even Justice
Scalia-whose REA analysis appears to give less deference to state
laws than Justice Stevens's-considers only the role of class actions
as a joinder device. Justice Scalia found that Rule 23 was

Rule 41(b)'s mandated claim-preclusive effect of its judgment) would seem to
violate [the REA]."). Justice Stevens joined Justice Scalia's Semtek opinion.
Justice Stevens also cited Semtek favorably in his Shady Grove concurrence.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
164. See Steinman, Our ClassAction Federalism,supra note 23, at 1163.
165. My focus here is res judicata (claim preclusion) because a defendant
who successfully thwarts class certification might not be entirely free from other
forms of preclusion. Depending on the circumstances, a judgment against a
defendant as to a single plaintiff could be binding on that same defendant in future
lawsuits via collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) with respect to particular issues
that were decided against the defendant. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (recognizing the availability of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion in federal court). Such preclusion is not automatic, however. For
example, if the first action seeks only "small or nominal damages" (as might be the
case if individual claims are not of particularly high value), future courts can
conclude that offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is inappropriate. See id. at 330
("If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may
have little incentive to defend vigorously.").
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permissible "insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their
separate claims against the same defendants in a class action."l 6 6 In
this sense, according to Scalia, Rule 23 was no different than other
"rules allowing multiple claims (and claims by or against multile
parties) to be litigated together," such as Rules 18, 20, and 42(a).1
The focus on class actions as a joinder device leaves us with
an incomplete picture of a class action's potential impact on
substantive rights. The ability of mass aggregation to spread costs
and make litigation less expensive for plaintiffs is an important
reason why plaintiffs usually invoke, and defendants usually fight,
the class action device.168 But the preclusion consequences of class
certification are arguably distinct from the potential cost efficiencies
of aggregation. Indeed, Justice Scalia's caveat that Rule 23 is
permissible only "insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their
separate claims against the same defendants in a class action" might
be particularly significant with respect to preclusion principles.' 69
An important feature of the class action device is that it yields
judgments that bind defendants even as to plaintiffs who have yet to
"willing[ly]" step forward. 170
Of course, some have criticized class actions precisely
because they treat as full-fledged litigants "an entirely comatose
class of plaintiffs, who have never chosen to enforce their private
rights and are even unaware that a suit has been brought on their
behalf."'71 Others, however, have argued that enabling litigation on
behalf of passive class members serves the valuable function of
"compelling corporate defendants to internalize the social costs of
their actions."1 72 Whatever the merits of these arguments as a policy
matter, there is no question about the ability of class actions to bind a

166. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J.).
167. Id.
168. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,supra note 23, at 1164.
169. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added).
170. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1164 n. 162
(quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J.)).
171. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 71, 129 (2003).
172. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 103, 139 (2006).
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defendant even as to class members who have not taken the initiative
of filing suits themselves. Justice Scalia's treatment of class actions
as merely another joinder device for purposes of the REA overlooks
Shady Grove, therefore, fails
this crucial aspect of class actions.'
to consider the potential ramifications of class certification on
preclusion,1 74 an area that Justice Scalia-among others-has
recognized as likely beyond the permissible bounds of federal
rulemaking. 7 5
C.

The Lower Federal Courts After Shady Grove

For the reasons set forth above, strong arguments remaineven after Shady Grove-that state-law approaches to class actions
should apply in federal court under the doctrine surrounding Erie and
the REA. And federal courts are doing just that. So far, the most
successful arguments in this regard have been based on the
substantive-rights provision of the REA, as described below.176
Post-Shady Grove cases have yet to embrace the idea that a
conflict with Rule 23 can be avoided by accommodating state classcertification principles when applying the elements set out in Rule
23(a) and 23(b). One federal court of appeals, however, has taken a

173. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
174. This is not to say that the effect of class actions on preclusion
necessarily makes it problematic for purposes of the REA's substantive-rights
provision. For example, one might argue that when it comes to preclusion "[t]he
substantive right is merely the right not to be bound as against non-parties," and
therefore "[t]he Federal Rules may permissibly regulate the procedural issue of
whether, in a given case, it should certify a class and thereby deem an absent
Steinman, Our Class Action
litigant a 'party' for preclusion purposes."
is simply that this is an open
here
point
My
at
1178.
note
23,
supra
Federalism,
question that Shady Grove does not resolve.
175. Justice Stevens's logic in Shady Grove is also consistent with an
argument that the REA must protect state approaches to class certification because
of their impact on preclusion. Given the strong suggestion in Semtek that
preclusion is a matter of substantive law, it is no leap to argue that class
certification is "procedural in the ordinary use of the term"; but it is "so
intertwined with the state right or remedy" created by the preclusive effect of a
judgment "that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right." Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
176. See infra notes 190-198 and accompanying text.
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similar approach when considering the impact of state law on class
action settlements. In the ubiquitously named case, All Plaintiffs v.
All Defendants,1 77 a federal district court approved a class action
settlement in an antitrust case, but several settlement checks that
were mailed to class members were returned as undeliverable.' 7 8
The State of Texas intervened, claiming that state law gave it the
right to take custody of unclaimed funds allocated to class members
whose last known address was in Texas. 179 The federal district court
concluded that Federal Rule 23(e)-which authorizes courts to
approve class action settlements that are "fair, reasonable, and
adequate" 80-allowed it to distribute the unclaimed funds through
the doctrine of cy pres to an academic center at the University of
Texas. 181
The Fifth Circuit held that Rule 23(e) did not "cause a direct
collision with [Texas] law,"l 82 because nothing in the Rule 23(e)
inquiry "implies an authority to disregard state property laws."' 8 3
"Rule 23(e) only 'collides' with the Act in this case if one construes
the Rule to include a blanket authorization to disregard state property
laws in the context of administering a settlement."l8 But the Court
concluded that "[n]othing in the Rule's text or structure leads us to
adopt such an aggressive construction."'
Indeed, Rule 23(e)'s
requirement that the settlement be "fair, reasonable, and adequate"
provides plenty of leeway for courts to heed state laws relating to
unclaimed property.186 Along the same lines, the certification

177. 645 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2011).
178. Id. at 330.
179. Id. at 331.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
181. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. MDL 1206, 2009 WL
5195977, at *7-10 (Dec. 22, 2009), rev'd sub nom, All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337.
182. All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 333 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
183. Id. at 334-35.
184. Id. at 335.
185. Id.
186. One interesting aspect of the All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants case is that
it involved a class action arising under federal antitrust law, whereas the Erie
doctrine is commonly viewed as a feature of cases arising under state law that find
their way into federal court because of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steinman,
What Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 23, at 311 & n.360 (noting "the oft-stated
assumption that Erie governs only cases subject to diversity jurisdiction and,
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requirements in Rule 23(a) and 23(b) provide plenty of leeway for
courts to heed state laws on whether a class action is appropriate in
any given situation, particularly if we take seriously the view of all
nine Shady Grove Justices that, for Erie purposes, the Federal Rules
should be construed to avoid substantial variations in outcomes
between state and federal cases.' 8 7
Even where federal courts do not take this approach to
determining whether Rule 23 conflicts, clashes, or collides with state
law, several post-Shady Grove decisions have concluded that it
would abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights to disregard
certain state class action laws.'8 As an initial matter, several lower
courts have concluded that Justice Stevens's concurring opinionwhich is ostensibly more deferential to state law than Justice Scalia's
opinion' 89-constitutes Shady Grove's holding with respect to the
REA's substantive-rights provision. As one federal district court
explained:
Under the rule announced in Marks v. United States,
when a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.

therefore, does not apply in federal question cases"). I do not examine here
whether this fact alone casts doubt on the Fifth Circuit's use of Texas law in this
case. It should be noted, however, that Erie and the REA are not categorically
limited to diversity cases and can apply in federal question cases as well. See, e.g.,
id. at 311-12 (describing problems with viewing Erie and the REA as applying
only to diversity cases); see also John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REv. 693, 737 n.226 (1974) ("The Enabling Act, in limiting Federal
Rules promulgated for civil actions, indicates no distinction between diversity and
federal question cases."); Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408-09 n.122 (1964) (stating that
the idea that "the Erie decision was limited to diversity cases" is an "oftencountered heresy" and that "[t]he correct view" is that "the Erie doctrine applies,
whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its
source in state law").
187. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
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Here, that means that Justice Stevens's concurrence is
the controlling opinion.1 90
Using Justice Stevens's Shady Grove analysis, some federal
courts have concluded that it would violate the REA to disregard
certain state laws in favor of Federal Rule 23.191 One example
involves a provision of Ohio law that, just like the New York
provision at issue in Shady Grove, forbids class actions for certain
kinds of claims. Multiple courts have held that § 1345.09 of the
Ohio Revised Code-which precludes class actions for some
consumer claims unless the challenged conduct was "previously
declared to be deceptive" 19 2 -must block such a class action in
federal court as well. 3 One court put it as follows:
Rule 23
Stevens
because
[Ohio's]
[Rules]
purports

is ultra vires under the approach of Justice
(the crucial fifth vote in Shady Grove)
it "would abridge, enlarge, or modify
rights or remedies, and thereby violate the
Enabling Act."
Here, O.R.C. § 1345.09
to define Ohio's substantive rights and

190. Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977)) (brackets, other citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Driscoll v. George Washington University, _F.
Supp. 2d _,
No. 12-0690
(ESH), 2012 WL 3900716, at *6 n.5 (D.D.C. Sep. 10, 2012) ("[B]ecause Justice
Stevens's concurrence sets forth a narrower ground as to the second step of the
Shady Grove analysis than does Justice Scalia's opinion, this Court agrees with the
parties that Justice Stevens's concurrence controls for that step." (citations
omitted)); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010);
Leonard v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 10-CV-4676, 2012 WL 764199, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2012). One lower court concluded that Shady Grove was a case
"where 'Marks breaks down,"' but it nonetheless held that Justice Stevens's
opinion "should be deemed controlling" with respect to the REA because it
"occupies a middle ground of sorts" between the plurality and the dissent. Jones v.
Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 824, 853 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (quoting
United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WL-65000,
2010 WL 2756947, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010) (calling Justice Stevens "the
crucial fifth vote" in Shady Grove).
191. See infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.
192. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (2012).
193. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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remedies by creating a cause of action for defrauded
consumers and declaring the relief available to them.
The class action restriction in O.R.C. § 1345.09(B) is
intimately interwoven with the substantive remedies
available under the OCSPA.19 4
Federal courts have reached similar conclusions with regard to other
states' restrictions on class actions.' 9 5
These kinds of decisions confirm that-notwithstanding
Shady Grove-certain aspects of state law on class actions may be
binding in federal court. What is interesting about the examples so
far is that they exclusively involve aspects of state law that, as in
Shady Grove, are less favorable to class actions than Rule 23. Yet
the conventional wisdom described above-as confirmed by the
debate surrounding CAFA 1 96 -is that many state courts are more
willing to certify class actions than their federal counterparts. As far
as Erie and the REA are concerned, what is good for the goose
should be good for the gander. There is no reason why the argument
should be any weaker for state laws that are more tolerant of class
actions.

194. Whirlpool, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Accord McKinney, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 ("Because application of Rule 23
would 'abridge, enlarge, or modify' Ohio's rights and remedies by permitting class
actions even when the requirements in § 1345.09 are not satisfied, it is ultra vires
under the Rules Enabling Act." (citing Whirlpool, 2010 WL 2756947, at *2-3)).
195. See, e.g., In re MI Windows and Doors, Inc. Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
2:11~cv-00167-DCN, 2012 WL 5408563, at *5 n.3 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2012)
(applying South Carolina law); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp.
2d 670, 676-77 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying Illinois law); Bearden, 2010 WL
3239285, at *10 (applying Tennessee law); see also Driscoll, 2012 WL 3900716,
at *17 ("DCMWA's opt-in mechanism confers substantive rights such that
application of Rule 23 in these circumstances would violate the Rules Enabling
Act.").
196. See supra nn. 28, 156 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

For critics of CAFA, the arguments outlined in this Article
may provide one way to mitigate the effects of expanded federal
jurisdiction over high-stakes class actions that are founded on state
law. While Shady Grove seems at first glance to undermine these
arguments, a closer analysis of the Shady Grove opinions reveals that
they remain viable. Indeed, federal courts have continued to read
Erie and the REA to require federal courts to follow aspects of state
law regarding class actions.
Predicting how the relationship between CAFA, Erie, the
REA, and Shady Grove will unfold in the future is a challenging
endeavor. The surprising split among the Justices in Shady Grove
confirms as much. Thus, it is hard to say with confidence how the
current Justices would address these particular questions if they find
their way back to One First Street. Anyone who is counting heads,
of course, should not overlook the one change to the Court's
membership since Shady Grove: Justice Stevens-who cast the
deciding vote against state law in Shady Grove-has been replaced
by Justice Kagan. Although she has yet to weigh in on Erie and the
REA as a Justice, her other votes and opinions on class actionssome with strong federalism dimensions-suggest it would not be
shocking if she sided with Justice Ginsburg and the Shady Grove
dissenters when these issues return to the Court.' 97

197. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (2011) (Justice Kagan
writing for a unanimous Court that a federal court that had denied certification of a
class action pursuant to Federal Rule 23 could not enjoin certification of a state
court class action that would be subject to state certification standards); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756-63 (2010) (Justice Kagan
joining Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion (along with Justice Ginsburg) arguing
that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California law making an
arbitration agreement's class action waiver unconscionable); see also Comcast
Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435-37 (2013) (discussed supra note
30) (Justice Kagan joining a dissenting opinion authored by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1190-97 (2013)
(discussed supra note 30) (Justice Kagan joining majority opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561-65
(2011) (Justice Kagan joining Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion arguing that
the class action against Wal-Mart satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)). Adherents to the
alphabetical theory described earlier should also take note that Justice Kagan's
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In the meantime, the vertical forum shopping that motivated
CAFA-and that CAFA itself now inspires-will surely continue.
The question of which forum will adjudicate high-stakes class
actions (and will therefore decide whether such cases may be
certified as class actions at all) is what I have called the first focus of
Our Class Action Federalism.198 By expanding the universe of class
actions that will ultimately end up in federal court, CAFA places an
even greater emphasis on a second question: once a putative class
action is pending in federal court, what role does state class action
law play? Shady Grove is the beginning of that discussion, but it is
far from the last word.

replacement of Justice Stevens tips the Court's balance in favor of the first half of
the alphabet. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that in Shady
Grove the Justices whose last names begin with letters in the first half of the
alphabet argued for the application of state law).
198. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism, supra note 23, at 1132
("At first, the focus was which forum-state court or federal court-was better
suited to adjudicate high-stakes class actions. This was the principal subject of the
2005 Class Action Fairness Act, which expanded federal diversity jurisdiction to
encompass a wider range of class actions, even when the class's claims arise
exclusively under state law.").

